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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
J, J, N. P, COMPANY, a Utah 
limited partnership, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
the DIVISION OF WILDLIFE 
RESOURCES, Case No. 17183 
Defendant-Respondent. ) 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The action was originally brought by Plaintiff-Appellant 
challenging the constitutionality of Section 23-15-10, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended, which prohibits the maintenance of 
private fish installations on any of the natural waters of the 
state. The State of Utah counterclaimed for a declaratory judg-
ment to the effect that the statute in question was valid as an 
effort to protect public recreational rights in the natural 
waters of the state. 
DISPOSITION JN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court ruled that Section 23-15-10, Utah Code 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Annotated 1953, as amended, was fully constitutional and that 
the state's denial of Appellant's private f' h · t 11 is ins a ation pern:i• 
was necessary and proper. The court also found that the road~ 
to Lake Canyon was a public road. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent State of Utah seeks a complete affirnance of 
the lower court's judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant is a limited partnership created under the laws 
of the State of Utah which owns a large tract of land in Duchesne 
County. 
Lake Canyon Lake is a natural lake located in Duchesne 
County, approximately ten (10) miles up from the mouth of Lake 
Canyon. The lake is approximately 800 yards long and 200 yards 
wide, with a mean depth of 17 feet and a maximum depth of 33 
feet (R. 40, 51, 106-107, 178). 
The State of Utah has managed Lake Canyon Lake as a public 
fishery, and the general public has used the lake as a public 
fishery, for nearly half a century. The state's management 
program has included eradication measures to eliminate trash fi~ 
stocking game fish (trout), setting seasons and creel limits, la'i 
enforcement inspection and control, and similar measures (R. 376· 
377, 391-392, 394, 178). The evidence does not reveal when the 
general public first began to use the lake for recreational pu~ 
poses, but David Thomas, a lifelong resident of Duchesne couney, 
-2-
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testified that he began Zishing the lake in the early 1930's 
and that the general public has fished there since then (R. 375-
376). The lake has attracted sportsmen not only from the Uinta 
Basin but from many parts of the state, including Carbon County 
and areas along the Wasatch Front, and these sportsmen have 
included organized groups, such as Boy Scouts (R. 392-393). 
Public fishing activities have included winter ice fishing 
(R. 392-393). The lake, because of its size and depth, is capable 
of sustaining various forms of water-based recreation other than 
fishing, such as boating and waterfowl hunting. The evidence 
was uncontroverted that the Division of Wildlife Resources used 
a 16-foot boat with a 25 horsepower engine to poison the lake 
for trash fish in 1973 (R. 377-378). There was even evidence 
that during the winter a small plane had actually landed on the 
frozen surface of the lake and later took off (R. 394-395). For 
the convenience of the Court, several pictures showing the lake, 
its surrounding area and ice fishing and stocking activities 
which are in evidence (R. 44-47) have been photocopied and appear 
in this brief as Figures 1 through 6 at pages 2a, 4a, and 6a. 
The land surrounding Lake Canyon Lake is in private owner-
ship and is now owned by Appellant (R. 302) . From 1969 through 
1978 an agreement existed between the State of Utah and the owner 
of the land surrounding the lake (Appellant's predecessor in 
interest) , whereby, inter alia, the landowner allowed public access 
on and across lands adjacent to the lake in order to fish the 
lake, and the state confined the fishing season to the winter 
-3-
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months (ice fishing) so that fishermen would not disturb the 
landowner's summer grazing of livestock (Defendant's Exhibit 
20, found at R. 42-43, R. 379-381, 400-401, 178). 
Over the years appellant has acquired legal or equitable 
ownership of approximately 1,200 acres of land in or near Lake 
Canyon, and in 1978 acquired the land surrounding Lake Canyon 
Lake (R. 302). Shortly after such acquisition, Appellant filed 
an application with the Respondent Division of Wildlife Resources 
for a permit to operate a private fish installation on Lake CB~ 
Lake for the propagation of fish for the private control and use 
of Plaintiff. Such permit was denied by the Division pursuant 
to Section 23-15-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, for 
the reason that Lake Canyon Lake was a natural lake, and the 
statute prohibits the maintenance of a private fish installation 
on any natural lake or stream. 
The Appellant has filed three diligence water rights on U~ 
Canyon Lake for stockwatering purposes, but has no rights to 
actually divert water from the lake (R. 341-342). However, s~a 
the use of Lake Canyon Lake for recreational purposes would not 
require any diversion of water from the lake, such uses could 
not interfere with any existing water rights on, above or below 
the lake (R. 179). 
There is a lower pond or lake in Lake Canyon, approximate~ 
seven miles below Lake Canyon Lake, which is also a natural la~ 
(R. 301). Donald Andriano, Chief of Fisheries for the Division 
of Wildlife Resources, testified that a permit for a private 
-4-
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fish installation had been issued for this lower lake some time 
prior to 1971, when Section 23-15-10 was amended to provide for 
the first time that private fish installations could not be 
authorized on any natural watercourse, and that the permit has 
been renewed annually, even after the 1971 amendment. Mr. Andriana 
said that such annual renewals had been issued because the owner 
of the permit had made substantial and expensive installations 
prior to 1971, in reliance on continued private pond statutes 
for the lower lake. Mr. Andriana said that he did not know of 
any legal opinion as to whether the 1971 statute contemplated 
any "grandfather" rights for continuation of pre-1971 permits 
on natural watercourses, but said that until there was such a 
legal determination, such permits probably would be renewed by 
the Division as a matter of equity because of the pre-1971 
expenditures. He said he did not know how many permits were in 
that category, but his estimate would be no more than half a 
dozen (R. 421-424). 
Mr. Andriana also testified that the reason behind Section 
23-15-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, was to protect 
private individuals from converting public bodies of water to 
their own private use, even though public access to surrounding 
land could be denied (R. 423). 
Finally, Appellant attempted to show that the public did not 
have access up the Lake Canyon Road because it was a private 
road. However, the evidence showed that Duchesne County has 
for more than ten years graded and maintained this road as a 
-5-
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public road for public use from the mouth of the canyon to the 
forest boundary above the lake. The road has been used as a 
public road by members of the public for nearly fifty years for 
various recreational and other purposes, including access tot~ 
National Forest (R. 356-359, 363-364, 395-396). There was no 
evidence of any interruption or interference with this public 
use other than the testimony of Mr. R. J. Pinder to the effect 
that he had tried to restrict access in 1978 by placing locks 
on a gate across the road, but that county officials or others 
promptly removed the locks in each instance within a period of 
not more than 24 hours and that after about two weeks of such 
futile efforts, he gave up trying to restrict access (R. 335-336, 
395-396) . 
After a trial and arguments, the lower court issued its 
Memorandum Decision (R. 164-165) and Findings of Fact, Conclusior.· 
of Law and Decree (R. 177-184). The Court held that Section 2H·: 
was not unconstitutional, because it was a valid legislative atte: 
to protect public recreational rights in the natural waters of tr.; 
state. The Court further held that the Division of Wildlife 
Resources had properly denied Appellant's application for a pri· 
vate fish installation permit (R. 180-181). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SECTION 23-15-10 u.c.A. IS VALID AND PROPER AS AN ATTEMPT 
BY THE LEGISLATURE TO PROTECT Pl'BLIC RIGHTS IN THE WATERS OF THE 
STATE. 
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Figure 6. Lake Canyon Lake~Looking Northeast 
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A. Introduction 
At this juncture, it would be helpful to briefly review 
the issues of the case. The basic relief sought by Appellant is 
~or a declaratory judgment that Section 23-15-10, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953, as amended violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 
United States Constitution in that it prohibits the maintenance of 
private fish installations on natural lakes and streams while 
allowing such installations on off-stream, artificial impound-
ments. Appellant claims that the distinction set forth in the 
statute is arbitrary and unreasonable. 
The statute was passed primarily to protect the rights of 
the public to use the natural waters of the state for recreational 
and other purposes (R. 423). Thus, the statute was passed to 
protect against the exact situation which Appellant seeks to bring 
about on Lake Canyon Lake. 
While the courts of Utah have clearly recognized public 
rights in natural watercourses, they have not been called upon 
to define the dimensions of the rights of the public to utilize 
the natural waters of the state for recreational purposes. The 
Legislature has also recognized such public rights and has been 
more explicit than the courts, and the statute in question is 
simply one example of legislative protection of such public rights. 
The public rights in the natural waters of the state exist 
regardless of who owns or controls the lands surrounding these 
waters. Therefore, issues as to whether the road up Lake Canyon 
is a public right-of-way, and whether Appellant controls the 
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access to Lake Canyon Lake, have no legal relevance to the pub[; 
recreational servitude on the lake itself. Nevertheless, it 
will be seen that the road is a public road, but that Appellant 
does control access to the lake. 
Appellant would have the Court believe that Section 23-15-l 
unconstitutionally denies it the right to use Lake Canyon Lake 
as a private fish farm; a right it claims by virtue of its owner· 
ship of the surrounding real property. But to the contrary, 
Appellant in fact is seeking to convert a public lake into a 
private fish farm for its own use, and to extinguish the inherer: 
rights of the public to use the natural waters of the state for 
recreational purposes. This is the exact result the challenged 
statute seeks to avoid and the very reason the statute was enact' 
The statute in question is clearly constitutional. The sta: 
holds all waters in trust for the people, and, while the water i: 
in its natural state as a lake or stream, the public in common 
has a right to utilize the water in its natural state for recrea· 
tional or other purposes. Such waters in their natural state afi 
not subject to private ownership. The subject statute merely 
prohibits private ownership and use of natural watercourses to 
protect public rights that have existed since statehood~and 
before. 
B. The Equal Protection Clause Does Not Prevent a State 
From Classifying Its Police Powers So Long as There 
Is a Rational Basis for Such Classification. 
It is recognized that the Equal Protection Clause, whk 
the Appellant claims Section 23-15-10 is violative of, does not 
prevent the state from classifying pursuant to its police pow~s 
-8-
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e~cept where such classification is done without any rational 
basis or is purely arbitrary discrimination. l>illiams v. Lee 
optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955), and Leavy v. Louisiana, 391 u.s. 
68 (1968). 
Justice Wolfe, speaking for the Utah Supreme Court in State 
" Mason, 78 P. 2d 920, 923 (Utah, 1938), stated: 
The discrimination must be unreasonable or arbi-
trary. A classification is never unreasonable 
or arbitrary in its inclusion or exclusion fea-
tures so long as there is some basis for the 
differentiation between classes or subject 
matters included as compared to those excluded 
from its operation, provided the differentiation 
bears a reasonable relation to the purposes to 
be accomplished by the act. 
See also Child v. City of Spanish rork, 538 P.2d 184 (Utah, 1975). 
The intent of the Legislature to protect the public's rights 
in the natural waters of the state provides a rational and proper 
basis for distinguishing between fish installations on natural 
1,•ersus artificial bodies of water. Moreover, it is fundamental 
that the Court will sustain the constitutionality of a statute 
whenever there is a rational basis for doing so. Williams v. 
Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Barr v. liatteo, 355 U.S. 171 
(1958); State v. Mason, 78 P.2d 920, 923 (Utah, 1938); Snyder v. 
Clune, 15 Utah 2d 254, 390 P.2d 915 (1964); and Child v. City of 
Spanish Fork, 538 P.2d 184 (Utah, 1975). 
There certainly is a rational basis for sustaining the statute 
in this case, particularly where, as will be shown below, not one 
iota of Jl.ppellant's property rights are infringed in any way. 
-9-
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C. The Legislature Has Recognized the Public's Fight to 
Use the Waters of the State for Recreational Purposes 
The courts of this state have clearly recognized the 
public's rights in the waters of the state, but as yet have not 
been called upon to define the dimensions thereof. The Legis-
lature has clearly recognized and provided protection for such 
public rights in several respects. The public's right to use t:-. 0 
waters of the state in natural lakes and streams for recreationa: 
purposes is a fundamental part of the public trust in such water; 
There may well be other public uses and interests in said wa~n. 
The very statute which Appellant challenges as having no 
rational reason for distinguishing between natural waters and 
private off-channel impoundments was passed for the very pur~H 
of protecting the public rights in the natural waters of the sta:, 
which would be impaired or destroyed if private individuals were 
allowed to turn natural lakes or streams into private fish insta> 
lations where they could raise and harvest their own fish. 
The state's ownership of the waters of the state in trust 
for the people is unquestioned and is similar to the state's 
trust ovmership of wildlife. In Adams v. Portage Irr. Co., 95 
Utah 1, 72 P.2d 648 (1937), the Utah Supreme Court stated at 
pages 652-653: 
~laters in this state are of two classes, public 
waters and private waters. The latter class is not 
onlv subject to exclusive control and ownership, 
but.may be used, sold, or wasted. It consists of 
such waters only as have been reduced to actual, 
physical possession of an individual by being.taken 
into his vessels or storage receptacles. It is 
private property and may be the subject of larceny. 
Public waters, on the other hand, are not the 
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subject of larceny. The title thereto is in the 
public; .all are equal owners; that is, have co-
equal rights therein, and one cannot obtain the 
exclusive control thereof. These waters are the 
gift of Providence; they belong to all as nature 
placed them or made them available. They are 
the waters flowing in natural channels or ponded 
in natural lakes and reservoirs. ~he title 
thereto is not subject to private acquisition 
and barter, even by the federal government or 
the state itself ... no title to the corpus 
of.the.wa~er itself has been or can be granted, 
while it is naturally flowing, any more than it 
can to the air or the wind or the sunshine. 
"Such water" said Blackstone, "is ... like 
wild birds on the wing." (Emphasis added). 
see also Deseret Livestock v. Sharp, 123 Utah 353, 259 P.2d 607 
(195 3) • 
Appellant asserts that since it owns the land surrounding 
and under the lake, it has the exclusive right to use the waters 
of the lake for its own private purposes. Such is not the law. 
To use an example, assume that a rancher owned a huge tract of 
land and there was a herd of deer which essentially stayed on 
that land all year round. Certainly the rancher could deny 
access to persons wishing to hunt the deer and therefore totally 
deny the public access to the deer; but just because he controls 
access would not allow him to kill all the deer himself, or con-
vert them to his own private property. The same reasoning applies 
to Lake Canyon Lake. 
The Legislature has expressly recognized an<l sought to 
protect the public's right to utilize the natural waters of the 
state for recreational purposes. The following are examples of 
instances where the Legislature, for one reason or another, has 
recognized and sought to protect public recreational rights in 
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the waters of the state. Section 73-3-8, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as amended, provides that the State Engineer, in approv~c 
new water applications, must consider the possible affect the 
application would have on public recreation: 
. where the state engineer has reason to 
believe that an application to appropriate water 
will . . unreasonably affect public recreation 
or the natural stream environment, or will orove 
detrimental to the public welfare, it shall.be his 
duty to withhold his approval or rejection of the 
application until he shall have investigated the 
matter. If an application does not meet the re-
quirements of this Section, it shall be rejected. 
Section 73-3-29, Utah Code ~..nnotated 1953, as amended, pro· 
vides that any person wishing to alter, change or relocate the 
channel of a natural stream must, under certain circumstances, 
obtain a permit from the State Engineer. Subsection 3 of that 
statute provides: 
(3) The state engineer shall, without undue 
delay, conduct investigations as may be reasonably 
necessary to determine whether the proposed relo-
cation, alteration or change will impair vested 
water rights, or will unreasonably affect any 
recreational use or the natural stream environ-
ment, or will endanger a~uatic wildlife. If the 
proposed relocation, alteration or change will 
not impair vested water rights or will not un-
reasonably or unnecessarily adversely affect any 
oublic recreational use or the natural stream ~nvironment, or endanger the aquatic wildlife, 
the application shall be approved. Otherwise, 
the application shall be rejected. Provided, 
however, the state engineer may approve the 
apolication, in whole or in part, or upon any re~sonable terms and recommendation that will 
protect vested water rights and/or any p~blic 
recreational use, the natural stream environ-
ment and the aquatic wildlife. (Emphasis added)· 
Section 73-14-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, 
sets forth the public policy of the state relative to water 
pollution: 
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ir.c 
Whereas the pollution of the waters of this state 
constitutes a menace to public health and welfare 
creates public nuisances, is harmful to wildlife ' 
fish and a9uatic ~ife, and impairs domestic, agri-
cultural, industrial, recreational and other legi-
timate beneficial uses of water, and whereas such 
pollution is contrary to the best interests of the 
state and its policy for the conservation of the 
water resources of the state, it is hereby declared 
to be the public policy of this state to conserve 
the waters of the state and to protect, maintain 
and improve the quality thereof for public water 
supplies, for the propagation of wildlife, fish 
and aquatic life, and for domestic, agricultural, 
industrial, recreational, and other legitimate 
beneficial uses. (Emphasis added). 
The above-cited statutes clearly show that the Legislature 
has, in various contexts, recognized and protected public recrea-
tional rights in the natural waters of the state. 
The very statute in question, Section 23-15-10, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended, was enacted to protect the same 
public rights that Appellant is now attempting to convert to 
its private use and ownership. Don Andriana, Chief of Fisheries 
for the Division of Wildlife Resources, testified that he person-
ally drafted the statute prohibiting private fish installations 
on natural lakes and streams. He further testified that the 
primary reason the statute was drafted was that numerous people 
were seeking permits to place private fish installations on 
natural waters, and the Division felt the public's rights in 
those waters needed to be protected (R. 422-425). The Legis-
lature obviously agreed, and the statute was passed. Since the 
public has inherent rights in the natural waters of the state, 
a statute providing protection for those rights is clearly a 
valid and constitutional exercise of legislative authority. 
-13-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The evidence in this case also makes clear that public 
recreational use of Lake Canyon Lake is not merely conjectural 
or theoretical. Numerous witnesses testified that the public 
from many parts of the state have used the lake for fishina, 
boating and other recreational purposes ever since the 1930's 
( R. 375). Further, the Division of Wildlife Pesources has for 
many years exercised its jurisdiction to manaqe Lake Canyon La:·:' 
as a trout fishery through stocking, eradication of trash fish, 
and issuance of citations when violations occurred (R. 44-47, 
376-377, 391-392, 394). The evidence is clear that Lake Can;1on 
Lake is truly a valuable recreational resource for the people o' 
the State of Utah, regardless of the present lack of access. 
Thus, the natural waters of the state are owned by the 
state and held in trust for the people, regardless of who ows 
the surrounding land. The public ownership of the waters of 
the state includes, among other thinos, the right to use those 
waters for recreational purposes, and the Legislature in this 
instance has merely recognized and provided protection for t~~ 
recreational rights. 
D. Public Recreational Rights in Hatural Waters Have Lone 
Been Recognized By the Courts. 
While the Utah Legislature has recognized and sought ~ 
protect public recreational rights in the natural waters of t~ 
state, the courts of this state have not been called upon to 
directly recognize and define the dimensions of such rights. 
However, many other states, including most of the states in the 
west, have recognized and upheld such recreational rights on 
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two somewhat different theories. The older theory bases such 
public rights on a test of "recreational navigability" or the so-
called "pleasure boat test." This theory is based on a broader 
test of navigability than the strict federal test of commercial 
navigability. This test would allow recreational uses of any 
waters capable of being floated by recreation craft such as 
canoes, etc. 
The other test, and the one we feel is more in keeping with 
established Utah law on public waters, is the test adopted by 
the Wyoming Courts in Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (vlyo., 1961). 
Under this theory, the state owns all natural watercourses for 
whatever lawful uses the public wishes to make of the water, 
including recreation. Under this theory, navigability is totally 
irrelevant. 
Turning to the older theory, it has been recognized that the 
public has rights in natural bodies of water for recreational use, 
even where such bodies of water are not deemed navigable under 
the well-known federal test of commercial navigability. 
The federal test of "navigability-in-fact" for commercial 
use of waterways is totally irrelevant to any issue in this case. 
It is relevant only for two purposes. One such purpose is to 
determine ownership of the beds of watercourses, and the "federal 
question" arises under the Equal Footing Doctrine, which holds 
that each state owns title to the beds of all navigable waters 
within its borders as a matter of constitutional "equal footing" 
among the states. The other purpose of the federal test is to 
determine whether there is federal regulatory authority under 
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the Commerce Clause of the United States constitutes. See~ 
Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557 (1871), Cnited States v. Utah, 293 li.s. 
64 (1931), and The Montello, 11 Wall. 411 (1370); on reheannc, 
20 Wall. 430 (1874). Thus, the federal test of navigability is 
plainly inappropriate as a guide to aid in the disposition of 
this case. 
However, it mi9ht be noted in pass in er that the federal tes: 
was formulated in an age in which waterborne corr.merce was the 
only economically important use of inland waters. With the pas· 
sage of time, commerce by barge and steamboat became less and le, 
important. At the same time, with the growth of society, water· 
based recreation greatly grew in popularity, and with it grew 
recognition of the strong state interest in protecting the right:: 
of citizens to recreation uses of "non-navigable" waters; "non-
navigable" meaning non-navigable under the federal test. 1 
For these reasons, the majority of state jurisdictions haw 
found a public right to recreation in public waters, even where 
the waters are non-navigable and the subaqueous land is private!• 
owned. Of those states west of the Mississippi which have con-
side red the matter, twelve have so held: California, People v. 
Mack, 97 Cal. Rptr. 448 (Cal. App. 197), People v. Sweetzer, JJ'. 
Cal. Rptr. 82 (Cal. App. 1977); Idaho, Southern Idaho Fish and 
Game Assoc. v. Picabo Livestock, Inc., 528 P.2d 1295 (1974); 
1Again, it should be noted, to avoid confusion, that 
riahts in natural waters need not be based on any concept 
na~igability, as will be seen below. ~-
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~innesota, Johnson v. Seifert, 100 N.W. 2d 689 (1960); Missouri, 
s. Elder v. Delcour, 269 S.W. 2d 17 (1954); New Mexico, State v. Red 
River Valley Company, 182 P.2d 421 (1945); North Dakota, Roberts 
v. Taylor, 181 N.W. 622 (1921); Oklahoma, Curry v. Hill, 460 P.2d 
933 (1969); Oregon, Luscher v. Reynolds, 56 P.2d 1158 (1936); 
South Dakota, Hillebrand v. Knapp, 274 N.N. 821 (1937); Washing-
st ton, Snively v. Jaber, 296 P.2d 1015 (195€), Kemp v. Putnam, 288 
P.2d 837 (1955); Wyoming, Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (1961); 
;. and Texas, Taylor Fishing Club v. Hammett, 88 S.W. 2d 127 (Tex . 
. c:. Civ. P.pp. 1937). 
1.I 
··r 
One of the earliest cases upholding the public right of 
recreation on "non-navigable" (non-navigable under the federal 
test) waters was made by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Lamprey 
v. State, 53 N.W. 1139 (1893). The court there applied the so-
called "pleasure-boat test" of navigability, explaining that there 
is a public easement for recreational navigation on any body of 
water capable of floating small pleasure craft to which there is 
lawful access, and that a physical capacity of the waters for 
commercial navigation was not required: 
Certainly, we do not see why boating or sailing 
for pleasure should not be considered navigation, 
as well as boating for mere pecuniary profit. 
~:any, if not the most, of the meandered lakes of 
this state are not adapted to, and probably will 
never be used to any great extent for, commercial 
navigation; but they are used~and as population 
increases and towns and cities are built up in 
their vicinity, will be still more used~by the 
people for sailing, rowing, fishing, fowl~ng, . 
bathing, skating, taking water for dom7sti~, agri-
cultural, and even city purposes, cutting ice, and 
other public purposes which cannot now be enumer-
ated or even anticipated. ~o hand over all these 
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lakes to private ownership, under anv old or 
narrow test of navigability, would b~ a oreat 
wrong upon the public for all time, the ~xtent 
of which cannot, perhaps, be even now antici-
pated. 53 N. W. at 1143 (Emphasis added) . 
It should be noted that if a private installation permit he 
been granted to the Appellant, it would have had the effect of 
turning over one of the state's natural lakes to private owners\ 
and control. 
The "pleasure boat" test has also been applied in Califorr.;o 
People v. Mack, 97 Cal. Rptr. 448 (Cal. App. 1971), was an actic:. 
to abate the stringing of cables across a river, which hampered 
the floating of the river by rafts and canoes. The California 
court noted that while the river was probably not navigable unde: 
the federal test, that did not preclude a more liberal state tes: 
of navigability for establishing a right of public passage w~u 
the stream was capable of floating small oar-propelled craft. t 
People v. Sweetzer, 140 Cal. Rptr. 82 (Cal. App. 1977), the cour: 
stated: 
In this state the public has a right to use for 
boating, swimming, fishing, hunting and all other 
recreation purposes, any part of a river that can 
be navigated by small recreational or pleasure 
boats, even though the river bed is privately 
owned. (Emphasis added). 
See also Bohn v. Albertson, 238 P.2d 128 (Cal. 1955); Forrester 
v. Johnson, 127 Pac. 156 (Cal. 1912); and Hitchings v. Del Rio 
\·Joods Recreation and Park District, 127 Cal. Rptr. 830 (Cal. P.pp. 
1976). 
While the public rights in natural waters need be based sol:: 
on recreational navigability (use of watercraft) , the evidence 
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is clear that Lake Canyon Lake is large enough to support and 
has supported recreational boating (P.. 377-378, 394-395, 392-393). 
Several of our neighboring states have based the public's 
recreational rights in the waters of those states on more inclusive 
grounds than the recreational navigability test. They adopt the 
concept that public recreational rights are merely one part of 
the general rights of the public growing out of the concept that 
the state holds title to all waters in trust for the benefit of 
the people. This is a better reasoned theory. 
The courts of 1·1yoming in Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 
1961), and New r'.exico in State v. Red River Valley Co., 182 P.2d 
421 (1945), while acknowledging the "navigability in fact" or 
pleasure boat test of navigability, have chosen to find a public 
easement for recreation based on the rationale that the state 
holds title to all waters in the state in trust for the benefit 
of the people, and the people have a right to use the waters while 
in natural watercourses of the state for recreational and other 
purposes. 
Thus, in Day v. Armstrong, supra, the Wyoming Supreme Court 
held that the issue of navigability was irrelevant, because the 
public had a right to beneficially use the waters of the state in 
natural watercourses for transportation and recreational purposes, 
even though the water was located over or flowed across private 
property, and the public had an easement to float on the water 
over the privately owned bed of the stream. The court stated: 
Irrespective of the ownership of the bed of a 
stream or of land upon which there are waters 
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or over which waters flow, the State's right to 
control and use its own waters as it sees fit is 
paramount ... Thus, the right of every person 
over or through whose lands the waters belongino 
to the State are found or flow and whose title -
to waters does not antecede that of the State 
is subject to the State's right to use and co~trol 
its waters as it sees fit. (362 P.2d at 144). 
(Emphasis added) . 
The court went on to state: 
The title to waters within this State beino in 
the State, in concomitance, it follows that there 
must be an easement in behalf of the State for a 
right of way through their natural channels for 
such waters upon and over lands submerged by them 
or across the bed and channels of streams or other 
~ollections of waters ... The waters not being 
in trespass upon or over the lands where they 
naturally appear, they are available for such 
uses by the public of which they are capable. 
When waters are able to float craft, they may be 
so used. When so floating craft, as a necessary 
incident to use, the bed or channel of the waters 
may be unavoidably scraped or touched by the 
grounding of craft. Even a right to disembark 
and pull, push or carry over shoals, riffles, 
and rapids accompanies this riqht of flotation 
as a necessary incident to the.full enjoyment 
of the public's easer..ent. (362 P.2d at 145). 
(Emphasis added) . 
The Idaho Supreme Court developed a rationale supporting a 
public recreational easement which adopted elements of both t~ 
pleasure-boat test and the Wyorning-New t'exico theory based on 
public ownership of waters. Thus, in Southern Idaho Fish and 
Game Association v. Picabo Livestock, Inc., 528 P.2d 1295 (Idaho, 
1974), the Plaintiff-Association sought a declaratory judgment 
that there existed a public right to float and fish in a creek 
flowing over the Defendant's land. This claim was made under~ 
Idaho statute creating such a right of use in waters cat:Jable of 
floating a log in excess of six inches in diameter at high wate'. 
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Idaho Code §36-901. See also Johnson v. ,Johnson, 95 Pac. 499 
(Idaho, 1908). 
The Idaho court found a public right to fish pursuant to 
the statute. But the court then went beyond the statute and 
judicially adopted the pleasure boat test contained in People v. 
~ack, supra. This rule, it was held, provided a public right of 
use for all lawful purposes, not merely fishing. Thus, the court 
said that in Idaho: 
Any stream, which, in its natural state will float 
logs or any other commercial or floatable commodity, 
or is capable of being navigated by oar or motor 
propelled small craft, for pleasure or commercial 
purposes, is navigable. 
This holding was based on a recognition that the State of 
Idaho held title to all waters of the state in trust for the 
public, subject to rights of appropriation. Idaho Constit. Art. 
15, §l. Thus, the court reasoned, there exists a public easement 
for a right-of-way through and upon natural water channels. The 
court stated that the issue of navigability is simply one of 
several tests to determine a body of water's suitability for 
public use: 
Appellant urges this Court to adhere to the test 
of navigability that is used in federal actions 
where title to stream beds is at issue. However, 
the auestion of title to the bed of Silver Creek 
is not at issue in this proceeding. This is not 
an action bv the State of Idaho or respondent to 
auiet title.to the bed of a naviqable stream. It 
is an action to declare the riahts of the public 
to use a navigable stream. The federal test of 
navigability involving as it does propert~ t~tle 
auestions does not preclude a less restrictive ~tate test of navigability establishing a right 
of public passage wherever a strear:1 is physically 
navigable by small craft. (528 P.2d at 1298). 
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For other cases where the courts have upheld the public's 
recreational rights in waters, see: Duval v. Thomas, 114 so. 2; 
791 (Fla. 1959); Harris v. Brooks, 283 Sil 2d 129 (11.rY:. 1955); 
Burt v. Meunger, 23 Nl'J 2d 117 (Mich. 1946); lie Bo Shone Ass'n 
State, 227 !lW 2d 358 (Mich. APP. 1975); Diana Shootina club v. 
Hurling, 145 Nl'l 816 (lhsc. 1914); and Branch v. Oconto county, 
109 NW 2d 105 (lhsc. 1961). See also: R. L. Knuth, Public Picrr.' 
of Recreation in Utah's Non-Navigable l'laters, 5 Jou:rnal of ContE·· 
porary Law 95 ( 1978) , and Johnson and Austin, Recreational Righ:: 
and Title to Beds on vJestern Lakes and Streams, 7 iiatural Resourc: 
L.J. 1 (1967). 
It should be emphasized at this point that the State of Uta:. 
is not claiming that the public has a right to trespass on the 
Appellant's property in order to fish at Lake Canyon Lake, a~ 
the trial court correctly held that the public has no such righu · 
However, the day may come when the public, for whatever reason, ' 
may be provided with such access. If the State, through its 
Division of Wildlife Resources, were to grant Appellant the righ: 
I 
to operate Lake Canyon Lake as a private fish installation, this i 
I 
would be impairing and violating its obligation to hold the natur:1 
water of the state in trust for the people, and its obligation to 
protect the public's recreation rights therein. 
In short, public recreational rights in the natural lakes 
and streams of the western states have long been recognized, 
whether under the "pleasure boat" test or the public trust test. 
The Utah Legislature, through Section 2 3-15-10, Utah Code Annotat<-
1953, as amended, has souqht to protect the natural waters of thE i I 
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state from being converted to private fish farms to the detriment 
of the rights of the public. The challenged statute offers just 
that protection, and is thus a lawful exercise of state powers 
and is fully constitutional. 
POINT II 
THERE ARE A FEW MATTERS \·JHICH REQUIRE CLARIFICATION 
A. Public Rights of Recreation and Private Water Rights 
Are Not In conflict 
It was explained and stipulated at the trial that there 
was absolutely no conflict between public recreational rights in 
natural watercourses and private water rights (R. 349). The 
public trust and public rights apply only to waters while they 
remain in natural lakes and streams. Ada~s v. Portage Irr. Co., 
95 Utah 1, 72 P.2d 648 (1937). Private water rights are acquired 
under state law by diverting water from natural lakes and streams 
and applying it to beneficial uses. See, generally, Title 73, 
Chapter 3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. Thus, it was 
made abundantly clear that the potential conflict between public 
rights and private rights was in reality no conflict at all, and 
even if there were a conflict, the appropriator would prevail. 
B. The water in Lake Canyon Lake Is Not Appropriated by 
Appellant 
At the trial and in Appellant's brief (page 15), much 
ado was made of the fact that Appellant had appropriated all of 
the waters in Lake canyon Lake. But that is not the case! Ap-
pellant has a "diligence" water right which entitles it to allow 
livestock to water in Lake Canyon Lake, and has an unapproved 
application on file with the State Engineer to appropriate water 
from the stream flowing from the lake to irrigate lands below 
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the lake. But Appellant does not own any water in the lake ano 
has not cited any evidence or authority whatsoever to support 
such a clail'1. Indeed, the Utah cases and statutes cited above 
uniformly preclude any such result. In any event, any recrea-
tional uses of the lake cannot and would not impair any vested 
water rights, and any argument along these lines is factually 
misconceived and legally irrelevant. 
C. The Private Pond Permit on the "Lower Lake" Is Justifi:.' 
There was also much ado at the trial about issuance of 
a private pond permit for another natural lake in Lake Canyon 
several miles below Lake Canyon Lake. Appellant contended~~ 
the state was inconsistent in renewing a permit for the lower 
lake while denying its application. But Donald lmdriano, Chief 
of Fisheries for the Division of Wildlife Resources, gave an 
entirely candid and uncontroverted explanation. 
The permit for the lower lake was issued many years ago, 
before the Utah law was amended in 1971 to expressly prohibit 
such permits on natural watercourses. The permit has been reM~· 
annually, even though such renewal might have been in violatioo 
of Section 23-15-10 since its amendment in 1971. However, the 
holder of the permit had made substantial and expensive instal-
lations prior to 1971, in reliance on continued private pond 
status for the lower lake. Mr. Andriano said that he did not 
know whether the 1971 statute contemplated any "grandfather" 
rights for continuation of pre-1971 permits on natural water-
courses, but until there was such a legal determination, such 
permits probably would be renewed because of the previous exper.· 
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d1tures. He said he did not know how many permits were in that 
category, but his estimate would be no more than half a dozen (R. 
~21-423). 
The situation with respect to the lower lake is exceedingly 
simple. The existing private pond permit for the lake may or 
may not be legal. But that is not an issue in this case. It 
plainly would be a direct violation of Section 23-15-10 if the 
state were to issue a private pond permit to Appellant for Lake 
Canyon Lake, and no comparison with the lower lake can change 
that fact. 
D. Appellant Is Not Being Denied Reasonable Use of Lake 
Canyon Lake or Its Real Property 
It is important to point out that by denying an appli-
cation for a permit to use Lake Canyon Lake for a private fish 
installation, the state is not denying or infringing upon any of 
Appellant's rights. Appellant will still have the right to deny 
public access from the public road to the shore of Lake Canyon 
Lake, and will therefore have exclusive access to fish the lake, 
subject, of course, to the license, season, and creel limit 
restrictions set forth in the state's general fishing procla-
mation. Appellant will still have full use of its land, may 
build its fishing lodge, and water its livestock pursuant to its 
Water User Claim. All that is being denied the Appellant is 
something that it clearly is not entitled to~that is, to convert 
a natural body of water, which is held by the state in trust for 
the public, to its own private, exclusive use as a private fish 
farm. such is not an unreasonable, inequitable or unconstitutional 
result. 
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POINT III 
THE ROAD UP LAKE Cfu~YON IS A PUBLIC ROAD 
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in rulinq t\ 
the road up Lake Canyon is a public road. However, ?ppellant 
does not contend that the evidence was insufficient to support 
such a finding. Rather, Appellant claims that the issue of the 
nature of the road was simply not a valid issue as framed by the 
pleadings. While the public road issue !".ay not have been spe-
cifically framed in the pleadings, it certainly became a hotly 
controverted issue of fact on which both parties offered evidenc 
and on which the court requested evidence. No one was surpriH~ 
by the issue. 
Initially, the issue of the road was raised in the afficla•::: 
of Clair Huff in support of the state's Motion for Summary Jude·, 
rnent (R. 41). Mr. Huff stated that Lake Canyon Lake was access:: 
to the public by a public gravel road (R. 41). Appellant fil~· 
counter-affidavit by Robert J. Pinder, in which Mr. Pinder allec'. 
that the road was a private road. 2 Appellant then filed a memo· 
randum in opposition to the state's Motion for Summary Judgment 
in which Appellant argued that there were many issues of contr~ 
verted fact requiring evidence, including whether the road was 
public or private (R. 53). 
On December 13, 1979 the court denied the state's Motion fc: 
Summary Judgment based, in part, on Appellant's assertion that 
2see also the photo attached to Mr. Finder's affidavit iR· 
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there existed controverted issues of fact. ~.mong the matters on 
11hich the court wanted to hear evidence was "whether the road 
leading to the lake is a public right-of-way" (R. 119). 
At the opening of the trial, the court again requested a 
list of the issues to be tried, and the following exchange took 
place: 
MR. QUEALY: Your Honor, I might say one 
thing at this point. When Mr. Cotro-Manes was 
swnrnarizing the issues and the burden of going 
forward, I think he left out two important issues 
that we are prepared to go forward on and that is 
on our Counterclaim as to the recreational--the 
[susceptibility] of that lake as to recreational 
navigability, and we are prepared to go forward 
on that. The Court I believe in its Memorandum 
Decision, also, listed as one of the issues whether 
that was a public road going up there and we have 
witnesses and are prepared to proceed on that 
unless Mr. Cotro-Manes no lonqer thinks that's a 
controverted issue. 
MR. COTRO-~.ANES: I think we should go for-
ward with that. 
THE COURT: And whose burden--
MR. QUEALY: On that I think it's Mr. Cotro-
Manes' claim that it was not a public road, so I 
think the burden there is on him. 
MR. COTRO-MANES: I think it's almost the 
burden of the person who claims it's public to 
prove it's public. 
THE COURT: Well, we will worry about that 
particular aspect as we move forward with the 
issues that were first identified as Mr. Cotro-
r:anes' position (R. 292-293) (Emphasis added). 
Evidence was then given by witnesses for both sides as to 
(o: the nature of the Lake Canyon Road. There can thus be no ques-
L 
tion that while the public nature of the road may not have been 
specifically framed as an issue in the early pleadings, it cer-
tainly became an issue as stated in the court's first memorandum 
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decision. Everybody knew this was an issue and proceeded 
ingly. For Appellant to now claim that such adJ'udicati'on · is no·, .. 
invalid is ludicrous! Rule 15, Utah Pules of Civil Procedure,. 
clear enough: 
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried 
by express or implied consent of the parties, they 
shall be treated in all respects as if they had 
been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of 
the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to 
conform to the evidence and to raise these issues 
may be made upon motion of any party at any time, 
even after judgment; but failure to so amend does 
not affect the result of the trial of these issues. 
(Emphasis added) . 
Both sides offered evidence as to the nature of the road, 
and the court properly found that the road was public (R. 180-U: 
It should also be noted that, for purposes of determining 
public rights in natural watercourses, it is legally irreleva~ 
whether the road up Lake Canyon is a public or private road. 
However, the evidence was overwhelming that the road was public. 
Duchesne County treated it as a public road and graded and mai~ 
tained it at county expense (R. 356-360; 362-364). 'i'he general 
public has used the road as a public road for at least half a 
century (since before 1930) (R. 379; 386; 395-396). 
In Utah, roads used by the public for ten years or more au 
conclusively deemed to be public roads by implied dedication. 
Section 27-12-89, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. see 
also: Morris v. Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 161 Pac. 1127 (1916); ~ 
Land & Livestock v. Churnos, 75 Utah 384, 285 Pac. 646 (1930); ~ 
Jeremy v. Bertagnole, 101 Utah 1, 116 P.2d 420 (1941). There ca: 
be no doubt that the Lake Canyon Road is a public road, at leas: 
to the Forest Service boundary. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Appellant claims that the statute prohibiting the issu-
ance of private fish installation permits on natural lakes or 
streams is unconstitutional because there is no reasonable basis 
for distinguishinq between natural bodies of water and artificial 
facilities. The State contends that there are important and 
valid public policy reasons for prohibiting such installations 
on natural bodies of water, the foremost being that to allow 
such private facilities impairs the public's right to utilize 
the public waters of this state which are suitable for recrea-
tional purposes, and would violate the state's position as 
trustee for the water and wildlife resources of the State. To 
hand over the natural lakes and streams to private ownership 
would, in the words of the Minnesota Supreme Court in the Lamprey 
case, supra, "be a great wrong upon the public for all time, the 
extent of which cannot, perhaps, be now even anticipated." Sec-
tion 23-15-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, regulating 
the issuance of private fish installation permits on natural 
lakes and streams was passed to protect these public interests, 
is fully constitutional, and should be upheld. 
DATED this day of January, 1981. 
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Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: ( 801) 53 3-4446 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Respon-
dent's Brief were mailed, first class postage prepaid, to Paul N. 
Cotro-Manes of Cotro-Manes, Warr, Frankhauser & Beasley, 430 
Judge Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, Attorney for Plaintif:· 
.11.ppellan t, this day of January, 1981 . 
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